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INTRODUCTION 
Many of Richard Posner’s opinions boldly confront great 
questions.1 But equally important are those that, in the aggre-
gate, illuminate discrete areas of the law and make them easier 
to understand. Among the best examples are Posner’s some two 
dozen opinions on promissory estoppel.2 They illustrate his ability 
to reshape the terms of even the most familiar debates. 
By the middle of the twentieth century, the idea took hold 
that, in addition to promises supported by consideration, prom-
ises seriously made and reasonably relied on were also legally en-
forceable.3 It was not easy, however, to reconcile this idea with 
traditional notions of contract law. It was not just that traditional 
contract law enforced only promises that were part of a 
bargained-for exchange. It was hard to hold both that all promises 
seriously made and reasonably relied on should be enforceable 
and still accept the statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, and 
other doctrines governing contract creation and enforcement. All 
of these have the effect of limiting the enforceability of promises 
on which people reasonably relied. 
It seemed possible that promissory estoppel would displace 
traditional contract law entirely. Liability would lie for careless 
speech as it does for any other careless act. Broken promises 
would become folded into a more general category of civil wrongs. 
 
 † Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago Law 
School. I thank Saul Levmore for his thoughtful comments. The Frank Greenberg Fund 
provided generous research support for this Essay. 
 1 See generally, for example, Baskin v Bogan, 766 F3d 648 (7th Cir 2014) (striking 
down state bans on same-sex marriages). 
 2 See generally, for example, Cosgrove v Bartolotta, 150 F3d 729 (7th Cir 1998); Miller 
v Taylor Insulation Co, 39 F3d 755 (7th Cir 1994). 
 3 See Joel M. Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel: The Life History of an Ideal Legal 
Transplant, 41 U Rich L Rev 425, 433–37 (2007). 
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This was the theme of Professor Grant Gilmore’s The Death of 
Contract.4 At the end of this short monograph, however, Gilmore 
holds out hope that someone might appear and restore order: 
We have witnessed the dismantling of the formal system of 
the classical theorists. We have gone through our romantic 
agony—an experience peculiarly unsettling to people intel-
lectually trained and conditioned as lawyers are. It may be 
that . . . [someone new] is already waiting in the wings to 
summon us back to the paths of righteousness, discipline, or-
der, and well-articulated theory. Contract is dead—but who 
knows what unlikely resurrection the Easter-tide may 
bring?5 
Gilmore had little inkling that one of his own colleagues at The 
University of Chicago, working just a few doors away, was indeed 
waiting in the wings. 
When interpreting the common law, Posner often sat in di-
versity. Far from wrestling with first principles, his task was to 
guess what another court would do if confronted with the same 
issue. He was not in a position to introduce striking new ideas or 
boldly reshape existing law. Nevertheless, Posner was in a posi-
tion to harmonize various strands of existing doctrine. The cumu-
lative effect of Posner’s many opinions on promissory estoppel 
was to domesticate the doctrine within the realm of traditional 
contract law. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
At common law, a promise, without more, was not legally en-
forceable—and for good reason.6 When a judge issues a judgment 
and awards money damages, it is not just so much talk. The judg-
ment entitles the prevailing party to a writ of execution, an order 
that compels the sheriff to seize property of the defendant.7 Al-
lowing a private actor to call on the coercive hand of the king was 
serious business. 
People, of course, should keep their promises. But that was 
not the question. The question rather was whether a breach of a 
particular promise was important enough that the king needed to 
 
 4 Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Ohio State 1974).  
 5 Id at 103.  
 6 See John P. Dawson, et al, Contracts: Cases and Comment 203 (Foundation 10th 
ed 2013). 
 7 Douglas G. Baird, Reconstructing Contracts 55–56 (Harvard 2013).  
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intervene. As between commercial actors, the rationale is 
straightforward enough. The king has an interest in ensuring 
that markets work. But what other kinds of promises rose to a 
level that justified the use of force? Common law lawyers took this 
question seriously. 
Early on, common law lawyers distinguished promises that 
were enforceable from those that were not by asserting that the 
former were supported by “consideration,” while the latter were 
not.8 Sometimes consideration was made synonymous with the 
causa that continental lawyers believed would make promises en-
forceable. There were other times when consideration was used 
interchangeably with the familiar quid pro quo of debt. Other 
times it was little more than a different way of saying that the 
promise in question was one of those that courts had previously 
found to be enforceable.9 
When Professor Christopher Columbus Langdell and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes attempted to formalize the law of contracts be-
ginning in the early 1870s, they offered an account of contract law 
that had hard edges.10 They insisted that consideration existed 
only if there were a bargained-for exchange. For consideration to 
exist, each party had to incur a detriment or bestow a benefit in 
exchange for the promise received from the other.11 
This account of positive law was something of an oversimpli-
fication.12 Nevertheless, during this era, the pronouncements of 
Cambridge-based legal academics were to a large extent self-
fulfilling.13 The most prominent lawyers had been students at 
Harvard or had learned the law from its alumni. So too the judges. 
They believed the law to be what these professors said it was. 
They argued their cases and issued their opinions accordingly. 
Consideration required a bargained-for exchange because their 
professors said it did. 
 
 8 For a somewhat more detailed account of this history, see John P. Dawson, et al, 
Contracts at 203–06 (cited in note 6). 
 9 See id at 204–05.  
 10 C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (Little, Brown 1871); 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law (Little, Brown 1881). 
 11 Holmes, Common Law at 293–94 (cited in note 10). 
 12 Courts in New York, for example, had long held that promises that were part of a 
charitable subscription were supported by consideration even though there was no 
bargained-for exchange. See generally, for example, Barnes v Perine, 12 NY 18 (1854). 
 13 With his edition of Kent’s Commentaries and his lectures on the common law, 
Justice Holmes was at the intellectual center of this legal circle even though he served on 
Harvard’s faculty for only a short time. See James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 
1826–30 (Little, Brown 12th ed 1896) (Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, ed). 
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Hence, one could set a change in the law in motion by per-
suading Professor Samuel Williston, Langdell’s successor as the 
teacher of contracts at Harvard, to temper the assertion that the 
only legally enforceable promises were those that were part of a 
bargained-for exchange. Those who set about this task—in the 
first instance Yale’s Professor Arthur Corbin—pointed to cases in 
which courts had found promises to be legally enforceable yet not 
part of a bargained-for exchange.14 
There was no general doctrine that promises seriously made 
and reasonably relied on were enforceable, but one could find 
cases that pointed in this direction. A grandfather gave his grand-
daughter a promissory note so that she did not have to work.15 
This led her to quit her job. But the grandfather died, and his 
executor refused to honor the promissory note on the ground that 
the promise was gratuitous and not supported by consideration. 
The granddaughter sued the executor and won. The court found 
that, by virtue of the reliance of the granddaughter, the executor 
was estopped from raising the defense of absence of consideration.16 
To reach this result, the court applied equitable estoppel in a 
familiar way. The doctrine limits the ability of a party to enter an 
otherwise meritorious pleading if the pleading was at odds with 
that party’s past conduct. I reassure a co-owner of a business that 
she can leave it for other ventures and not worry about the guar-
antee she has given me. Even if I do not formally waive the guar-
antee, my behavior keeps me from later suing her on the guaran-
tee. Invoking the guarantee in court is inconsistent with telling 
the promisor that she should pursue new ventures. The grandfa-
ther’s executor is similarly disabled from raising the absence of 
consideration in the face of the grandfather telling his grand-
daughter that she could quit her job. 
But equitable estoppel does not ineluctably lead to the en-
forcement of serious promises reasonably relied on as a general 
matter. The holder of a promissory note, such as the granddaugh-
ter, is presumptively entitled to payment. To enforce a note, she 
does not need to plead that the underlying promise was supported 
by consideration. Absence of consideration is a defense that must 
be pled by the person being sued on the note.17 Estoppel works in 
 
 14 See Gilmore, Death of Contract at 57–58 (cited in note 4). 
 15 See generally, for example, Ricketts v Scothorn, 77 NW 365 (Neb 1898). 
 16 Id at 367. 
 17 See, for example, UCC § 3-305(a)(2) (“[T]he right to enforce the obligation of a 
party to pay an instrument is subject to . . . a defense of the obligor.”). 
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the case of a negotiable instrument because the person who made 
the promise and broke it rather than the person who relied on it 
is the one who must plead absence of consideration. In the case of 
an ordinary promise, the promisee must affirmatively plead the 
presence of consideration. Estoppel does not enter the picture. 
The beneficiary of the promise has to take the first step. Like 
every plaintiff, she must be able to state a claim on which relief 
can be granted. She cannot do this if the promise she seeks to 
enforce is not part of a bargained-for exchange. 
Nevertheless, armed with this case and others invoking other 
doctrines, Corbin was able to persuade Williston and other mem-
bers of the American Law Institute that there was a general prin-
ciple at work. Reliance, in addition to consideration, sufficed to 
make promises legally enforceable. And the evolution of the doc-
trine did not stop here. In the decades that followed the adoption 
of the First Restatement of Contracts, promissory estoppel did not 
simply make reliance an alternative to bargained-for considera-
tion. It morphed into its own cause of action. 
Accepting promissory estoppel as a stand-alone cause of ac-
tion introduced difficulties. In the first instance, it lacks hard 
edges. How exactly does one go about distinguishing what reli-
ance is “reasonable”? Quite apart from the fuzziness of the doc-
trine, there was the question of what remained of traditional con-
tract law if reliance alone triggered legal liability. What is the 
need for the many ways in which the common law limits the en-
forceability of promises (such as the parol evidence rule or the 
statute of frauds)? 
This was the basic theme of The Death of Contract.18 Without 
its formal rules, contract law loses its coherence as a distinct 
branch of law and simply merges into tort law. Given the uncer-
tain boundaries of “reasonable reliance,” judges and juries are 
largely unconstrained. They are empowered to impose civil liabil-
ity according to their own sense of what is fair when people fail to 
keep their promises. 
From the perspective of many mid-century contracts schol-
ars, the death of contract was not such a bad thing.19 Courts ought 
 
 18 Gilmore, Death of Contract at 87 (cited in note 4) (“Speaking descriptively, we 
might say that what is happening is that ‘contract’ is being reabsorbed into the main-
stream of ‘tort.’”). 
 19 See, for example, Michael B. Metzger and Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of 
Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 Rutgers L Rev 472, 557 (1983): 
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to have the discretion to do the right thing to the extent justice 
required it. The statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, and 
other hoary contract doctrines were technical rules that allowed 
people who behaved badly to avoid responsibility for their actions. 
Many cases in which parties invoke promissory estoppel are 
ordinary disputes between business people that may not provide 
a compelling case for legal reform.20 It was easy enough, however, 
to find cases that made it easy to justify giving courts a general 
power to enforce promises seriously made and reasonably relied 
on. The facts of one notable case from the era illustrates. An in-
surance agent persuaded a young soldier to switch life insurance 
companies, assuring him that the new company, like his existing 
one, would cover him in the event he died in combat.21 The written 
policy the company issued, however, excluded war risk. 
The written policy was a completely integrated contract that, 
on its face, set out all the obligations of both parties. Hence, under 
traditional contract doctrine, the agent’s oral promise was not en-
forceable, and thus the beneficiaries of the policy were not entitled 
to recover. The court found the promise enforceable nevertheless: 
[T]his verdict recognized a duty of Prudential . . . to act in an 
honorable and upright way in accordance with its agent’s 
promise. Thus, application of promissory estoppel in no way 
trammels upon the parol evidence rule. Involved here is a 
separate enforceable promise and not a variance or modifica-
tion of the terms of the policy.22 
 
The judicial concern with pre-classical ideas of justice of which promissory es-
toppel is one expression has been on the rise throughout the twentieth century. 
Moreover, it has roots in the social experience of this century. Barring a thor-
oughgoing return to laissez-faire ideas, that trend is likely to continue, and the 
expansion of promissory estoppel should proceed apace. 
 20 Although promissory estoppel is frequently invoked when negotiations never ripen 
into a final agreement, courts typically resist applying it in this context. See Alan 
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 
Harv L Rev 661, 674–75 (2007). Promissory estoppel cases are most likely to be successful 
when business people interact and there are discrete undertakings on the part of one or 
the other without there being a formal agreement or the agreement itself being too indef-
inite to be enforceable as a traditional contract. See, for example, Cosgrove v Bartolotta, 
150 F3d 729, 733 (7th Cir 1998) (holding that an investor could recover on a promissory 
estoppel theory after reasonably relying on defendant restaurateur’s promise).  
 21 Prudential Insurance Co v Clark, 456 F2d 932, 934 (5th Cir 1972). 
 22 Id at 937. As it happens, Prudential could have been decided without reaching the 
question of the relationship between promissory estoppel and the formal rules of contract. 
It was a case in which the court might have relied entirely on traditional notions of equi-
table estoppel. Prudential had paid out on the policy and was suing to get its money back. 
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The pull of such compelling cases obscures the potential cost of an 
uncabined doctrine of promissory estoppel. It was all well and 
good to dismiss Langdell’s belief that there was some inner ine-
luctable magic to the rules of contract, but it is another thing al-
together to dismiss contract law’s formalities as useless. 
The statute of frauds ensures that, in deals of any conse-
quence, courts and juries will have the benefit of some writing 
that evidences the transaction.23 Similarly, the parol evidence 
rule forces the factfinder to focus on the written document.24 With 
such rules in place, legal decisionmaking becomes cheaper and 
less prone to error. Moreover, the existence of such legal rules 
changes the dynamics of negotiations between the parties. I can 
negotiate with you and explore possible deals without fearing that 
what I say will trigger liability. Only when I sign a writing show-
ing that we have reached a deal am I at risk of being bound. And 
I am bound only to what the document says. I do not have to worry 
that you misunderstood what I said during negotiations. 
Such rules can make parties to contracts better off. I am will-
ing to negotiate in a way that is more free-flowing and beneficial 
for both parties.25 Once one accepts the possibility that contracts’ 
formal rules have virtues and should remain in place at least to 
some extent, one needs some ability to cabin promissory estoppel. 
But how exactly does one go about doing this? 
Richard Posner confronted promissory estoppel in Economic 
Analysis of Law even while Gilmore was writing The Death of 
Contract. Posner noted that promissory estoppel was best con-
ceived as a species of tort. As with other torts, the relevant ques-
tion is “whether the imposition of liability will create incentives 
for value-maximizing conduct in the future.”26 
When my wealthy uncle carelessly promises to pay for my 
college education and then refuses to keep it, it makes sense to 
hold him liable if I gave up my part-time job as a result of the 
 
It is easy to argue that, once having made the promise and kept it, Prudential was equi-
tably estopped from using the court system to recover the money. 
 23 See Richard A. Lord, 9 Williston on Contracts § 21:1 (West 4th ed 2012).  
 24 See Richard A. Lord, 11 Williston on Contracts § 33:1 (West 4th ed 2012). 
 25 Legal scholars have long identified such benefits of formal rules. See, for example, 
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum L Rev 799, 813 (1941) (“Business deals 
can often emerge only from a converging series of negotiations. . . . To surround with rigid 
legal sanctions even the first exploratory expressions of intention would not only introduce 
an unpleasant atmosphere into business negotiations, but would actually hamper 
commerce.”). 
 26 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.1 at 43 (Little, Brown 1973). 
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promise. Given his promise, it was reasonable for me to rely on 
the promise. The world is a better place if people make only prom-
ises they intend to keep. It allows the beneficiaries of these prom-
ises to rely on them. The law is a useful lever to use to induce 
individuals to be careful when they make promises, just as it is a 
useful way to give them an incentive to drive carefully. Individu-
als should act and speak in a way that takes account of the costs 
that their actions have on others. 
The rationale that Posner put forward in Economic Analysis 
of Law was, however, made at a high level of abstraction. It is one 
thing to assert that legal rules can induce parties to speak more 
carefully, but such rules can also chill speech, especially when the 
risk of error is taken into account. Gratuitous transfers often 
come with backstories that are hard to understand. The potential 
for legal liability may prevent some promises from being made in 
the first instance. Even with commercial actors, it is not easy to 
determine exactly what sorts of assurances should give rise to le-
gal liability. Reliance alone is not sufficient. Weather forecasters 
know and want people to use their forecasts in making their 
plans, but they are not liable if they are wrong. 
Posner as an academic gave no hint about how a court should 
go about demarcating the realm of promissory estoppel. Moreo-
ver, in making a general observation about the coherence of prom-
issory estoppel as a cause of action, Posner did not confront the 
question of how to reconcile it with the technical rules of contract. 
On the bench, however, Posner had to face these questions 
repeatedly. To be sure, as a judge he was painting on a much 
smaller canvas. Nearly all contracts cases that came to him as a 
federal judge arose in diversity.27 He had to take the promissory 
estoppel doctrine of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana as he found 
it. All of them embraced promissory estoppel, albeit in different 
flavors. But what Posner could do (and did), even after taking the 
peculiarities of each jurisdiction into account, was make sense of 
these rules and impart order to them. 
 
 27 One exception is Miller v Taylor Insulation Co, 39 F3d 755 (7th Cir 1994), an 
ERISA case in which federal common law is used to fill in gaps and promissory estoppel 
is the relevant gap filler. 
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II.  PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND RISK ALLOCATION 
In his various promissory estoppel opinions, Posner put hard 
edges on the doctrine. Someone who pursues a promissory estop-
pel action must have relied on the promise. Some judges did not 
take this element seriously. Indeed, reliance is hard to see in 
Allegheny College v National Chautauqua County Bank of 
Jamestown,28 one of the most prominent landmarks in promissory 
estoppel jurisprudence.29 Posner, by contrast, insisted on reliance. 
In one case, a company dismissed an employee and at the 
same time promised to pay him through the end of the year.30 The 
promise was not part of a bargained-for exchange. The employee 
was properly terminated, and the company had no further obliga-
tion to him. And given the absence of any assertion that the dis-
charged employees changed by virtue of the promise, promissory 
estoppel did not lie either.31 Indeed, Posner found that asserting 
on appeal that such a promise is legally enforceable was frivolous, 
and he subjected those who made that argument to sanctions.32 
Considerably harder than insisting on reliance is distinguish-
ing between promises that are relied on that generate legal liabil-
ity from statements of future intention that are relied on that do 
not. A judge applying promissory estoppel must be careful in iden-
tifying what sorts of utterances qualify as a “promise” for pur-
poses of promissory estoppel. In Posner’s view, it is not sufficient 
that someone makes statements that are reasonably relied on. 
The person being spoken to must reasonably understand that the 
person doing the speaking is making a commitment to which she 
can be held.33 
 
 28 246 NY 369 (1927).  
 29 Id at 373–75. Properly speaking, the case was not decided on the basis of promis-
sory estoppel. Judge Benjamin Cardozo was able to find consideration on the part of a 
college that received a pledge. But there is much dicta about promissory estoppel, and no 
attention is paid in the course of this dicta to the fact that finding reliance under the facts 
was no easier than finding consideration. No one has ever rivaled Judge Cardozo in his 
ability to obfuscate and confuse in order to curry favor with the elites of the legal profes-
sion. And in Allegheny College, Judge Cardozo was at the height of his powers.  
 30 Colosi v Electri-Flex Co, 965 F2d 500 (7th Cir 1992). 
 31 Id at 504. Similarly, if a retired employee wanted to use promissory estoppel to 
enforce the company’s promise to provide medical insurance, he had to show that, in the 
absence of such a promise, he would have acquired insurance from some other source or 
otherwise changed his conduct. Miller v Taylor Insulation Co, 39 F3d 755, 759 (7th Cir 1994). 
 32 Colosi, 965 F2d at 505.  
 33 In this respect, Judge Posner’s promissory estoppel opinions stand in distinct con-
trast to Justice Roger Traynor’s, which show no awareness of this question. See, for exam-
ple, Drennan v Star Paving Co, 333 P2d 757, 760 (Cal 1958) (asserting that, because a 
subcontractor both expected and wanted the general contractor to rely on the promise, it 
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Consider the facts of Garwood Packaging, Inc v Allen & Co.34 
Garwood made a food-packaging system that had, in Posner’s typ-
ically direct and forceful language, “flopped” in the marketplace.35 
Garwood engaged Allen & Co to help it find new investors. 
Martin, Allen’s point person, looked for such investors and found 
some promising prospects. No one argued that a final deal was 
ever consummated, and there were no undertakings definite 
enough to create a traditional legally enforceable contract. But 
this did not end the inquiry. Promissory estoppel does not require 
the same degree of definiteness as a set of promises that are part 
of a legally enforceable bargained-for exchange. 
Martin had assured Garwood that Allen would put up half of 
the needed capital if investors could be found for the other half. 
On multiple occasions, he said that he would find the financing 
Garwood needed. He told the principals at Garwood that he would 
see that the deal went through “come hell or high water.”36 The 
principals relied on these assurances. They forgave their personal 
loans to Garwood. They moved from Indiana to Ohio to be closer 
to a prospective partner that Martin had found. Posner accepted 
the possibility that this reliance was reasonable.37 Taking actions 
such as moving to Ohio improved prospects of closing a deal by 
enough to justify the costs, even after discounting for the possibil-
ity that the deal might never close. 
But Posner found that reliance alone was not enough.38 Some-
one can make assurances about her plans and intentions and rea-
sonably foresee (and perhaps affirmatively desire) that these as-
surances lead to costly reliance. But this is not enough for legal 
liability. Statements of future intention can be sufficiently quali-
fied that they do not rise to the level of promises. 
In another opinion, Posner used a series of hypotheticals to 
unpack this idea.39 A father tells his son that he is thinking of 
promising him on his next birthday that if he gives up smoking, 
the father will restore him as a beneficiary under his will. The son 
enrolls in an expensive cigarette addiction plan as a result. A con-
tractor tells a subcontractor that he would consider him only if he 
 
was “only fair” that the subcontractor should be bound in the event the general contractor 
won the contract). 
 34 378 F3d 698 (7th Cir 2004). 
 35 Id at 701.  
 36 Id.  
 37 Id at 704–05. 
 38 Garwood, 378 F3d at 704. 
 39 See Cosgrove v Bartolotta, 150 F3d 729, 733 (7th Cir 1998). 
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had more minority workers in his employ, and the subcontractor 
goes out and hires some more. In both cases, reliance may be rea-
sonable, but in neither case is there a cause of action for promis-
sory estoppel. What is said is too qualified to count as a promise 
even if it induces reasonable reliance. 
Martin told the principals that he would see that the deal 
would happen “come hell or high water.”40 But these words cannot 
mean, as Posner put it, that Martin was promising that the deal 
would go through even if Satan appeared or a tsunami obliterated 
Ohio.41 Words have to be understood in context. Garwood’s prin-
cipals were not unsophisticated rubes. One of them had been an 
investment banker.42 Among such actors, Martin’s words fall 
short of being a promise at all. Martin is merely announcing his 
intention to do what he can to make the deal happen. He is not 
promising any outcome. The principals might sensibly rely on this 
statement, but they cannot hold Martin liable if the deal does not 
happen. 
But there are variations on Garwood that Posner does not 
consider. What if, for example, Martin said he would make the 
deal happen come hell or high water and then sat on his hands? 
Is it a fair construction of his words to include an implicit promise 
to use his best efforts to make the deal happen? Could the princi-
pals sue for a breach of that promise if Martin did nothing? Per-
haps the better interpretation of Posner’s opinion in Garwood is 
not that there was no promise but rather that none was broken. 
Figuring out what counts as a “promise” and what counts as 
“reasonable reliance” is far from straightforward. With respect to 
both, it is an effort to provide one party with the incentive to en-
gage in the optimal amount of communication and the other with 
the incentive to engage in the optimal amount of reliance on the 
communication. A judge who is too willing to find that something 
rises to the level of being a full-fledged promise chills communi-
cation and induces overreliance. 
Where other judges found implicit promises in order to invoke 
promissory estoppel, Posner found implicit qualifications to prom-
ises that rendered them unenforceable.43 Posner justified doing 
this with a rationale he employed elsewhere. The obligations that 
the law implies have to reflect a sensible understanding of what 
 
 40 Garwood, 378 F3d at 701. 
 41 Id at 704. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See id.  
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rational parties would undertake if there were explicit bargain-
ing. Cases can arise in which there is a promise in a literal sense 
and reasonable reliance on the part of the promisee, but it does 
not make sense to find legal liability. Parties would qualify their 
promises appropriately if they had the time to do so. Hence, it 
makes sense to treat these promises as if these qualifications 
were there. 
ATA Airlines, Inc v Federal Express Corp44 is a case in which 
a promise was made and may have been reasonably relied on, and 
yet promissory estoppel did not lie.45 Federal Express, in ex-
change for promising to provide aircraft to the Department of 
Defense in the event of an emergency, acquired rights to provide 
nonemergency transportation for the government at favorable 
rates. These rights were transferable, and ATA sought to acquire 
a portion of Federal Express’s rights. Negotiations progressed suf-
ficiently far that Federal Express wrote a letter in which it agreed 
to transfer some of its rights to ATA. 
Given the letter, Posner recognized, “there is no question that 
there was a promise.”46 The letter left so many details open that 
it was not sufficiently definite to be enforceable under traditional 
contract law. Hence, he had to confront the question of whether 
the promise was enforceable under a theory of promissory estop-
pel. The question for Posner was therefore whether “the promise 
was (or could reasonably have been understood to be) intended to 
induce, and could reasonably induce, reliance to the tune of $28 
million.”47 
Posner read into Federal Express’s promise implicit qualifi-
cations. As he explained: 
If someone tells you “I promise you X, but don’t hold me to 
it,” the promisor is making clear that he is not inviting reli-
ance and the promisee cannot, by ignoring the warning and 
relying on the promise to his detriment, make the promise 
enforceable.48 
Federal Express might not have explicitly said ATA could not 
hold it liable for the promise, but it makes sense to treat its prom-
ise as if it had. “ATA could not reasonably have believed that 
 
 44 665 F3d 882 (7th Cir 2011).  
 45 Id at 888–89. 
 46 Id at 888. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Garwood, 665 F3d at 885. 
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FedEx intended to commit itself to split the passenger business.”49 
For this reason, “[s]uch a ‘promise’ may create an expectation but 
does not create a commitment, and so the promisee relies at his 
risk.”50 
In importing such qualifications, Posner confronted the same 
sort of challenges inherent in enforcing a traditional contract. The 
judge must discover the “tacit agreement” between the parties. As 
Justice Holmes explained, the extent of liability “should be 
worked out on terms which it fairly may be presumed he would 
have assented to if they had been presented to his mind.”51 
Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co v Charter Barclay 
Hospital, Inc52 is another case Posner approached in this fash-
ion.53 An insurance company agreed to provide insurance to a 
company’s full-time employees. The son of the company’s owners 
enrolled in the plan, representing himself as a full-time employee. 
When the son was admitted to a psychiatric hospital, the hospital 
called the insurance company to verify that the son had enrolled 
under the plan, and the insurance company affirmed that he had. 
As Posner recounted, with characteristic vividness, it turned out 
that the son did not work for the company. The son was instead 
“a male stripper and pimp facing criminal charges for these activ-
ities.”54 The insurance company was therefore not obliged to cover 
the costs of his hospitalization even though it told the hospital 
that it would. 
The question was whether the hospital could rely on the insur-
ance company’s representation that the son was enrolled in the 
plan and hold it liable. Posner found that the hospital could not: 
As an experienced hospital operator, it is charged with know-
ing that insurers of employee benefit plans do not, upon re-
ceiving an application for coverage by a person claiming to be 
an employee, conduct an in-depth investigation of the appli-
cant’s entitlement to coverage and certify that entitlement in 
answer to inquiries by medical providers. That would be 
rather an absurd burden to place on the insurer, when we 
 
 49 Id (emphasis in original). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Globe Refining Co v Landa Cotton Oil Co, 190 US 540, 543 (1903). 
 52 81 F3d 53 (7th Cir 1996). 
 53 See id at 57. 
 54 Id at 55. 
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reflect that the plan might cover hundreds or even thousands 
of employees.55 
But Posner may have made the case seem easier than it was. 
To be sure, it is hard for the insurance company to know whether 
those enrolled are in fact entitled to coverage. But it may be even 
harder for the hospital. Someone has to bear the risk, and it is not 
self-evident it should be the hospital rather than the insurance 
company. 
Three parties are involved: the employer, the insurance com-
pany, and the hospital. The policy is more valuable to the em-
ployer if the insurance company is obliged to reimburse hospitals 
for a claim submitted by those who enroll, even if they later prove 
ineligible. When the insurer is bound, the hospital will be able to 
admit everyone enrolled under the plan. An employer should be 
willing to pay more for such a policy. It wants its workers to be 
able to receive medical care when they need it without having to 
establish that they are entitled to receive the benefits. 
If the employer, the hospital, and the insurance company 
could bargain explicitly, would the insurance company assume 
the risk that some of those who enrolled might not in fact be eli-
gible? How does one assess whether the benefits of such a promise 
are greater than the costs and that it is therefore sensible to read 
into the insurance company’s assurances to the hospital its ac-
ceptance of the risk that someone enrolled under the plan is not 
in fact eligible? Such gap filling is what judges must do with re-
spect to ordinary contracts. 
There are no magic formulas here, but Posner did identify 
what matters. The problem of promissory estoppel requires flesh-
ing out the allocation of risks that the parties would have made 
for themselves had they confronted the subject explicitly. There 
is not a traditional contract, but the fundamental problem is the 
same as if there were.56 Legally enforceable promises are those in 
which the addition of legal enforceability makes the parties 
jointly better off. Far from signaling the death of contract, apply-
ing promissory estoppel requires engaging in the same enterprise. 
 
 55 Id at 57. 
 56 For Posner’s account of this task of gap filling in the context of an ordinary con-
tract, see Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tex L 
Rev 1581, 1605 (2004) (“[T]he best, the most cost-efficient, way to resolve [a] dispute . . . 
is to use commercial or economic common sense to figure out how, in all likelihood, the 
parties would have provided for the contingency that has arisen had they foreseen it.”). 
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III.  RECONCILING PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL WITH FORMAL RULES 
To this point, I have not examined how Posner tried to recon-
cile promissory estoppel with the traditional rules of contract for-
mation. The discrete legal question that arises most often is 
whether promissory estoppel is still available when there is an 
ordinary bargained-for exchange but the statute of frauds is not 
satisfied. For example, this question is raised in Consolidation 
Services, Inc v KeyBank National Association.57 Were Posner free 
to answer this question as a matter of first impression, his opin-
ions suggest that the traditional rules of contract law would 
trump promissory estoppel: 
Since the doctrine merely provides an alternative to consid-
eration as a basis for enforcing a promise as a contract, it 
would be anomalous to use it to take an oral promise out of 
the domain of the statute of frauds.58  
When confronting concrete questions such as whether prom-
issory estoppel lies even when the statute of frauds would make 
the promise unenforceable, a federal judge sitting in diversity 
does not have a free hand. She must guess how the state’s highest 
court would treat the case. But the judicial decisionmaking is not 
entirely fettered. The highest court may not have faced the ques-
tion, and even if it has, a federal judge sitting in diversity must 
still decide how the rule of decision handed down by the state 
court applies to the facts before her. Posner showed how a resort 
to first principles was useful with respect to both tasks. 
A good example came when Posner confronted Indiana’s 
promissory estoppel regime. In Indiana, as elsewhere, a promisee 
must do more than show simple reliance to avoid the statute of 
frauds. In the language of the Second Restatement, the statute of 
frauds prevents enforcement of the promise unless “injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”59 The task for the 
 
 57 185 F3d 817 (7th Cir 1999). 
 58 Id at 822. See also All-Tech Telecom, Inc v Amway Corp, 174 F3d 862, 869 (7th Cir 
1999) (“When there is an express contract governing the relationship out of which the 
promise emerged, and no issue of consideration, there is no gap in the remedial system for 
promissory estoppel to fill.”). 
 59 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) (1981): 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce 
the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds 
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy 
granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires. 
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judge, including federal judges sitting in diversity, is to apply this 
higher bar to the facts at hand. 
Indiana’s formulation was somewhat different than that of 
the Second Restatement, but it is cut from the same cloth: 
[I]n order to establish an estoppel to remove the case from 
the operation of the Statute of Frauds, the party must show 
[ ] that the other party’s refusal to carry out the terms of the 
agreement has resulted not merely in a denial of the rights 
which the agreement was intended to confer, but the inflic-
tion of an unjust and unconscionable injury and loss.60 
What is needed is some understanding of “unjust and unconscion-
able” that goes beyond, as Posner put it, “judicial indignation at 
dishonorable behavior by promisors.”61 It is not an easy task. As 
Posner explains, “To answer the question requires us to explore 
the provenance of a phrase at once vague (what does ‘unjust and 
unconscionable’ mean?) and redundant (how does ‘injury’ differ 
from ‘loss’?).”62 
One cannot simply assess the moral worthiness of the prom-
isor’s behavior. As an ethical matter, people should keep their 
promises, and from this, it is only a small step to say that justice 
requires enforcing the promise in virtually every case. To make 
sense of this doctrine, Posner grounded the doctrine in its 
rationale. 
This is again a familiar theme of Posner’s contract jurispru-
dence. With respect to any particular doctrine, one must first un-
derstand the purpose that the doctrine is serving and interpret it 
accordingly. For example, when one party threatens to breach un-
less the other party, who has already sunk costs in performance, 
renegotiates, the party who succumbs to the threat can call on the 
doctrine of duress. To establish whether “duress” exists under any 
particular set of facts, one must first understand why the doctrine 
exists in the first place. 
The formal grounds for refusing to recognize the renegotiated 
deal is the absence of consideration to support the modifications, 
 
For an example of a state court applying this test, see Kolkman v Roth, 656 NW2d 148, 
156 (Iowa 2003). 
 60 Coca-Cola Co v Babyback’s International, Inc, 841 NE2d 557, 569 (Ind 2006), quot-
ing Brown v Branch, 758 NE2d 48, 52 (Ind 2001). This formulation originates in Justice 
Traynor’s opinion in Monarco v Lo Greco, 220 P2d 737, 741 (Cal 1950). 
 61 Classic Cheesecake Co v JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 546 F3d 839, 845 (7th Cir 2008). 
 62 Id at 842. 
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but such a rule does a poor job of distinguishing between the co-
ercive renegotiation and the one that arises because of changed 
circumstances. Hence, in his opinions applying the doctrine of du-
ress, Posner insisted that the judge should not engage in a me-
chanical search for consideration (not a straightforward process 
in any event) but rather focus instead on the question of whether 
the party forcing the renegotiating is taking advantage of a situ-
ational monopoly.63 The economic concept of “situational monop-
oly” fleshes out what “duress” means.64 
In one of his best-known contracts opinions, Posner similarly 
looked to underlying principles to understand the duty of good 
faith each party to a contract owes the other.65 In Posner’s view, 
the duty of good faith serves to “forbid the kinds of opportunistic 
behavior that a mutually dependent, cooperative relationship 
might enable in the absence of rule.”66 The duty is best understood 
as embodying the set of “implied conditions necessitated by the 
unpredictability of the future at the time the contract was 
made.”67 It forbids opportunistic behavior and requires the coop-
eration that is essential to mutually beneficial trade. 
One can contest how much good faith conceived in this fash-
ion requires in any particular case.68 Nevertheless, at the very 
least, the requirement that parties act in good faith prevents one 
party from taking deliberate advantage of an oversight by the 
other. If they had the time and the money, parties would write 
contracts that prohibited every game of gotcha. Hence, it makes 
sense to imply a general duty that has the same effect. 
The “unjust and unconscionable” test for determining 
whether promissory estoppel escapes from the statute of frauds 
can be grounded in a similar fashion.69 To be sure, the task is not 
the same. In the other cases, the task is implying terms to flesh 
out a bargain that the parties have already reached. In assessing 
the applicability of the statute of frauds to a promise seriously 
 
 63 See id at 846. 
 64 See Oxxford Clothes XX, Inc v Expeditors International of Washington, Inc, 127 F3d 
574, 579 (7th Cir 1997). For a discussion of Judge Posner’s approach to the doctrine of duress, 
see generally Douglas G. Baird, The Young Astronomers, 74 U Chi L Rev 1641 (2007). 
 65 See Market Street Associates Ltd Partnership v Frey, 941 F2d 588, 593 (7th Cir 1991). 
 66 Id at 595. 
 67 Id at 596. 
 68 Some have criticized Posner’s Market Street opinion on this ground, arguing that 
the duties it puts in place are too narrow. See Todd D. Rakoff, Good Faith in Contract 
Performance: Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 120 Harv L Rev 1187, 
1195–96 (2007). 
 69 Babyback’s, 841 NE2d at 569. 
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made and reasonably relied on, the question is the enforceability 
of the promise in the first instance. Nevertheless, the interest 
served, one of optimizing the value of promises that people make 
to one another, is the same. 
The statute of frauds applies when the stakes are large 
enough that a court needs to be confident that a deal was in fact 
struck and it will not mistakenly enforce a promise that was never 
made.70 The heightened reliance requirement serves the same 
purpose. Instead of asking about injustice in the abstract, the 
court should ask whether there was “a kind or amount of reliance 
unlikely to have been incurred had the plaintiff not had a good-
faith belief that he had been promised remuneration.”71 Given 
that factfinding is inherently prone to error, it makes sense to 
give parties an incentive to make the factfinder’s task easier. One 
can, however, carve out exceptions when the costs of failing to en-
force the agreement are high and the likelihood of error is suffi-
ciently small. 
Monarco v Lo Greco,72 the state law case that first allowed for 
promissory estoppel in the context of a traditional contract ren-
dered unenforceable by the statute of frauds, was particularly 
compelling by this account. It involved a stepson who had worked 
on a farm for two decades. He received only room and board and 
spending money. The stepson asserted that he did this work in 
reliance on his stepfather’s unwritten promise to pass it on to him 
when the stepfather died. 
Posner likened the stepson in Monarco to the travails of 
Jacob at the hands of his uncle Laban.73 By contrast, the facts in 
the case before him were altogether different. He faced a case in 
which entrepreneurs sought a bank loan for their business. They 
asserted that a bank officer promised them that their loan appli-
cation would be approved, and they took a number of steps, such 
as repaying defaulted student loans that the bank officer said 
were necessary to have the loan approved by the higher-ups at 
the bank.74 
With respect to both the stepson and the entrepreneurs, there 
were allegedly promises that were relied on. What distinguished 
them was not that the stepfather behaved in a way that was more 
 
 70 See Lord, 9 Williston on Contracts § 21:1 (cited in note 23). 
 71 Classic Cheesecake, 546 F3d at 845. 
 72 220 P2d 737 (Cal 1950). 
 73 Classic Cheesecake, 546 F3d at 843–44. 
 74 Id at 840–41. 
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reprehensible than the loan officer but rather that the stepson’s 
reliance was utterly inconsistent with the stepfather never hav-
ing made a promise, while the behavior of the entrepreneurs (tak-
ing steps such as paying off a defaulted loan and waiting a few 
weeks for a decision) was not.75 Entrepreneurs take such steps all 
the time in pursuit of bank loans even without promises being 
made to them. The idea here, as elsewhere in Posner’s contracts 
jurisprudence, is to start by identifying the inner logic of the com-
mon law rules themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of Richard Posner’s promissory estoppel opinions made 
only small, incremental steps. This is necessarily the case for a 
judge who was interpreting the law of other sovereigns. But the 
aggregate effect of these opinions put promissory estoppel in an 
altogether different light than what Professor Gilmore presented 
in The Death of Contract or what many other academics have of-
fered since. As Judge Posner conceived it, the boundaries of prom-
issory estoppel can be drawn. It does not consume all of tradi-
tional contract law. There are some cases in which promissory 
estoppel claims prevail, but relatively few. Seen together, 
Posner’s promissory estoppel opinions show the reach of the doc-
trine to be far less than Gilmore feared or mid-twentieth-century 
contract scholars hoped. More importantly, they show how com-
plicated, messy problems can be put in perspective by casting a 
cold eye on them and figuring out what connects them to the cases 
that have come before. Doing this, like the use of metaphor, offers 
“intelligibility with the objective world.”76 
It is a commonplace to point to the way in which microeco-
nomics informed Posner’s judicial thought. Less often noted is the 
other great influence on his intellectual development. Posner’s ac-
ademic training before law school was not in economics but in lit-
erary criticism. Indeed, he devoted all of his last year of college to 
a study of the late poems of W.B. Yeats. Posner found himself un-
der the spell of a particular form of literary analysis known as 
New Criticism.77 One of the giants of this school was Professor 
 
 75 See id at 844. 
 76 See Richard A. Posner, Yeats’ Late Poetry: A Critical Study (unpublished thesis, 
Yale University, 1959), quoted in William Domnarski, Richard Posner 27 (Oxford 2016). 
 77 See Domnarski, Richard Posner at 26–29 (cited in note 76) (describing the influ-
ence of New Criticism on Judge Posner’s career). 
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Cleanth Brooks, and it was under Brooks’s supervision that 
Posner wrote his study of Yeats. 
Before the New Critics, literary criticism focused heavily on 
the cultural background in which works had been written. The 
lives of the great poets and the literary environment in which they 
wrote were the focal point. The New Critics believed that trying 
to understand poetry by looking at the biographies of those who 
created them was a mistake. It was, in the words of Professor 
William K. Wimsatt, another dominant figure in Yale’s English 
department, the “intentional fallacy.”78 Instead, the New Critics 
claimed, literary criticism should begin and end with a hard look 
at the poem itself and the way it is put together. 
A successful poem was, in Brooks’s words, like a well-
wrought urn.79 It had to be assessed on its own terms. Approach-
ing the judicial enterprise with unflinching clarity and incisive 
thought, the hallmark of Richard Posner’s work over the last four 
decades, is very much in this spirit and explains to a great extent 
why, in the clarity and insight that he brought to promissory es-
toppel and everything else he touched as a judge, Richard Posner 
had no peers. 
 
 78 See W.K. Wimsatt Jr and M.C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, 54 Sewanee 
Rev 468, 469 (1946) (“Judging a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine. One demands 
that it work. It is only because an artifact works that we infer the intention of an artificer.”). 
 79 Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry 19–20 
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1947). 
